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Summary
BACKGROUND: The coronavirus disease (COVID)-19
epidemic is evolving rapidly. Healthcare workers are at in-
creased risk for infection, and specific requirements for
their protection are advisable to ensure the functioning
of the basic healthcare system, including the availability
of general practitioners (GPs). Understanding the trans-
mission risk is particularly important for guiding evidence-
based protective measures in the primary healthcare set-
ting.
METHODS: Healthcare worker contacts of an initially un-
diagnosed COVID-19 case, who were without personal
protective equipment, in particular not wearing facemasks,
were screened with nasopharyngeal swabs and poly-
merase chain reaction tests for severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), irrespective of
respiratory symptoms or fever seven days after initial con-
tact. The details of exposure to the index case were ob-
tained during routine contact investigation after uninten-
tional pathogen exposure.
RESULTS: Twenty-one healthcare workers reported con-
tacts with the index case. Three healthcare workers re-
ported respiratory symptoms (cough) or low-grade fever
within 4 days. None of them tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2 at the time of symptom onset. All 21 healthcare
workers tested SARS-CoV-2 negative 7 days after initial
index case contact, including the three healthcare workers
with previous symptoms. Ten of the 21 healthcare workers
reported a cumulative exposure time of >15 minutes.
Longer cumulative contact times were associated with
more individual contacts, reduced contact time per contact
and activities with physical patient contact. The closest rel-
ative of the index patient tested SARS-CoV-2 positive 2
days after the index case presented at the hospital emer-
gency department.
CONCLUSION: We found a low risk of SARS-CoV-2
transmission in a primary care setting. These findings are
compatible with previous reports of the highest transmis-
sion probability in household settings with prolonged close
contacts. The current protective measures for healthcare
workers, including strict adherence to basic standard hy-
giene and facemasks, offer considerable protection during
short periods of contact with symptomatic COVID-19 cas-
es by diminishing the risk of direct and indirect transmis-
sion.
Keywords: SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19, healthcare work-
ers, transmission risk, facemasks, hospital hygiene,
droplet precaution
Introduction
Since early March 2020, when the severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic reached
Switzerland, symptomatic cases have increased rapidly [1].
Many more cases that are mildly symptomatic are sus-
pected to contribute to the evolving case numbers [2, 3].
Patients seek medical advice irrespective of the epidemic
and healthcare workers, in particular general practitioners
(GPs), are at the forefront of exposure to as yet undiag-
nosed or subclinical infectious cases [4]. The association
of coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 with certain comor-
bidities suggests that undiagnosed patients will seek med-
ical advice from their GP or at the emergency department
for symptoms other than respiratory complaints [5, 6].
SARS-CoV-2 is mainly transmitted through respiratory
droplets and direct contact with contaminated surfaces
[7‒9]. Many healthcare workers and GPs feel insecure be-
cause recommendations for personal protection equipment
may vary between public health agencies. In addition, sup-
plies of personal protective equipment such as face masks
may be not secure for long. In urgent cases, even in emer-
gency departments, strict adherence to the recommenda-
tions may not be possible − in particular for patients ini-
tially not presenting with the typical respiratory signs of
SARS-CoV-2 infection.
*
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Here we report the outcomes of a contact investigation of
healthcare workers in a primary care hospital that faced
this particular scenario of having been exposed to SARS-
CoV-2 by a patient initially presenting for cardiac discom-
fort.
Materials and methods
All healthcare workers were followed up during routine
contact investigation after unprotected contact with a
COVID-19 index case. All healthcare workers were un-
aware of the index case’s COVID-19 status at the time of
contact and as a result none were adhering to the Swiss-
noso guidelines for personal protective equipment [10, 11].
All healthcare workers filled in a standard questionnaire
used for unintentional exposures to pathogens transmitted
by droplets or aerosols, according to local standard oper-
ating procedures, which evaluated their exposure risk by
occupation, location of exposure, approximate cumulative
exposure time, number of individual contacts during expo-
sure and activities performed during exposure. Nasopha-
ryngeal swabs were taken when healthcare workers report-
ed respiratory symptoms or fever, and for all healthcare
workers 7 days after the initial contact. Nasopharyngeal
swabs were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) (University Hospital Basel).
All healthcare workers were reminded to self-assess for
respiratory symptoms and to report to the hospital’s oc-
cupational health representative in the case of even minor
symptoms. These procedures are according the National
Guidelines (Swissnoso) [10] and adapted for the specific
situation according the initial risk assessment by the hos-
pital epidemiology team. No additional interventions were
undertaken.
Results
Index case and close contacts
The 75-year-old man was admitted to a primary care hos-
pital with angina pectoris and mild respiratory symptoms.
He was afebrile at admission. Laboratory evaluation re-
vealed slightly increased troponin but an electrocardio-
gram showed no signs of an acute myocardial infarction.
A chest X-ray was unremarkable. Triggered by the mild
cough and shortness of breath, an influenza nasopharyn-
geal swab was obtained with negative results. At the time
of hospital admission, neither the patient nor his close con-
tacts were aware of any SARS-CoV-2 exposure in the pre-
ceding weeks according to the testing recommendations of
the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) at that time
(testing by nasopharyngeal swab recommended for symp-
tomatic patients – respiratory symptoms and/or fever – and
patients with an epidemiological exposure, such as travel
to an epidemic region or close contact with a confirmed
COVID-19 case). The patient was admitted to intermedi-
ate care. During the overnight observation period he de-
veloped a high-grade fever, which was symptomatically
treated with paracetamol without any further diagnostic in-
vestigation. The following day he was referred to a ter-
tiary hospital for coronary angiography. There he was sub-
sequently diagnosed with COVID-19.
Among his close contacts, his wife fell ill with moderate
respiratory symptoms and fever 2 days after the initial pre-
sentation of the index case. She was the only person liv-
ing in the same household. She was also diagnosed with
COVID-19.
In retrospect, it became evident that the patient and his
close contact had been in contact with SARS-CoV-2-pos-
itive persons attending an international meeting, after
which more of the, in the meantime geographically dis-
persed, attendees were diagnosed with COVID-19.
Three different federal cantons became involved in man-
agement that included diagnosis and contact tracing of the
case.
Healthcare worker characteristics
In totals 21 healthcare workers were exposed to the undi-
agnosed index case at the primary care hospital (table 1).
All contacts were unprotected according to the guidelines
of COVID-19 hygiene measures [10, 11]. All healthcare
workers adhered to basic hygiene measures, in particular
hand hygiene, but none wore a face mask.
Their median age was 40 years (range 18–62) and 14
(66%) were female.
Exposure characteristics
Detailed exposure characteristics are presented in table 1.
Ten of the 21 healthcare workers had cumulative expo-
sure of >15 minutes within the same room as the index
case. Another five of the healthcare workers had only lim-
ited total contact ≤5 minutes. The number of individual
contacts increased with the cumulative exposure time. All
five healthcare workers reporting prolonged total exposure
time >30 minutes had >5 individual contacts and were in-
volved in nursing with direct physical contact. Four of the
five healthcare workers with a cumulative exposure time of
15–30 minutes had fewer individual contacts (three to five)
and reported fewer activities associated with prolonged
physical contact. Only 3 of the 11 healthcare workers with
total exposure time <15 minutes had direct physical con-
tact (clinical examination, blood draw, nasopharyngeal
swabs) with only one or two individual contacts. Three
healthcare workers were exposed for only a short period
during activities within the same room.
SARS-CoV-2 testing
Three of the 21 healthcare workers reported upper respira-
tory tract symptoms within 4 days of initial exposure. All
healthcare workers tested SARS-CoV-2 negative by PCR
of the nasopharyngeal swab at the time of symptom on-
set. The three symptomatic and the remaining asympto-
matic healthcare workers were all tested 7 days after the
initial exposure by means of nasopharyngeal swabs and
PCR. All tests were negative, including the repeated tests
in the symptomatic healthcare worker. None of the ex-
posed healthcare workers reported to the hospitals' staff
physician with respiratory symptoms (shortness of breath,
cough, angina) during the reminder of follow-up for up to
2 weeks after exposure.
Discussion
Following exposure without personal protective equipment
to an index case presenting with cardiac symptoms in a pri-
mary care setting, all 21 healthcare worker contacts test-
ed negative irrespective of their symptomology 7 days af-
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ter contact (at the upper 95% confidence interval of the
median incubation time [12, 13], although longer incuba-
tion periods have been described [14]). We assume that
the index case was infectious at the time of the contacts,
as evidenced by the clinical presentation with shortness of
breath and mild unproductive cough, followed by the de-
velopment of fever triggering SARS-CoV-2 nasopharyn-
geal swab testing after an overnight sojourn in the hospi-
tal. The only close contact also contracted SARS-CoV-2,
fell ill only 2 days after the initial presentation of the index
case and was diagnosed SARS-CoV-2 positive. We can-
not exclude that the index case and his partner contracted
the infection from a common source, although the index
patient may have transmitted the virus in the pre-sympto-
matic phase [15]. The patient underwent routine investi-
gations for ischaemic cardiac disease with clinical exam-
ination, blood draws, electrocardiogram and chest X-ray
associated with close physical contact. Even nasopharyn-
geal swabs were taken for mild respiratory distress without
any specific precautions; the patient’s history did not meet
the FPOH criteria for SARS-CoV-2 testing at the time. Al-
though three healthcare workers developed mild respirato-
ry symptoms at the time the results of the index case be-
came available, none tested positive.
These results indicate that routine short clinical examina-
tions and short physical contacts did not place the health-
care workers at risk sufficient for them to have acquired
SARS-CoV-2. In a similar investigation of 41 healthcare
workers, all of whom wore masks (85% surgical masks,
15% N95 masks during intubation), who were exposed to a
potentially aerosol-generating contact with an undiagnosed
index patient, none developed any symptoms and all test-
ed SARS-CoV-2 negative by PCR after 14 days of self-
quarantine [16]. This observational report and ours support
the current Swissnoso and FPHO recommendations for the
healthcare worker personal protective equipment measures
in Switzerland pertaining to the risk from aerosol gener-
ating procedures [10, 11]. In minimal risk settings, such
as short physical examinations and limited nursing proce-
dures in which droplet- or aerosol-generating medical in-
terventions are not anticipated, surgical face masks and
physical distancing (2 metres) seem adequate to minimise
the risk of transmission. A meta-analysis found no addi-
Table 1: Healthcare worker characteristics and transmission risk factors
Variable % (total)
Gender male 33% (7/21)
Age (years), median (range) 40 (18 – 62)
Occupation
‒ Nursing staff 67% (14/21)
‒ Physician 24% (5/21)
‒ Radiology staff 9% (2/19)
‒ Not available –
Exposure location
‒ Emergency department 29% (6/21)
‒ Intermediate care 57% (12/21)
‒ Radiology 9% (2/21)
‒ Not available 5% (1/19)
Estimated cumulative duration
‒ ≤5 min. 24% (5/21)
‒ 5–15 min. 28% (6/21)
‒ >15–30 min. 24% (5/21)
‒ >30 min. 24% (5/21)
‒ not available –
Estimated individual contacts
‒ 1–2 contacts 33% (7/21)
‒ 3–5 contacts 24% (5/21)
‒ 6–10 contacts 5% (1/21)
‒ >10 contacts 19% (4/21)
‒ Not available 19% (4/21)
Activities performed during contacts*
‒ Anamnesis / conversation 62% (13/21)
‒ Physical examination 14% (3/21)
‒ Activity with physical patient contact (e.g., blood pressure measurement, blood draw, ECG) 33% (7/21)
‒ Nursing activities with prolonged physical contact (e.g., aid with washing) 24% (5/21)
‒ Nasopharyngeal swab 5% (1/21)
‒ Radiology 9% (2/21)
‒ No direct contact / stay in same room 9% (2/21)
‒ Not available 5% (1/21)
Number of healthcare workers wearing face masks (for any reason) 0% (0/21)
Number of healthcare workers developing respiratory symptoms within 7 days after exposure 14% (3/21)
Number of NPS tested SARS-CoV-2 positive
‒ Of symptomatic patients at symptom onset 0% (0/3)
‒ Of all healthcare workers contacts at day 7 0% (0/21)
* More than one answer possible
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tional benefit for face masks in conveying higher protec-
tion efficacy in influenza and influenza-like illnesses [17].
Our report is in sharp contrast to initial studies in China re-
porting increased infection rates among healthcare workers
[4], and current media and anecdotal reports of COVID-19
cases among healthcare workers in Swiss hospitals. We be-
lieve that these reports are not necessarily at odds with
each other because transmission risks in the respective set-
tings may completely differ from the risk during nearly
continuous exposure in endemic or aerosol-generating set-
tings. Fully in line with this, most transmission events in
COVID-19 clusters have occurred within the same house-
hold or after enclosed, extended close contact [18, 19].
Our observational study has several limitations of impor-
tance for its interpretation. The index case was only cough-
ing mildly and intermittently. Droplet projection was prob-
ably limited, which reduced environmental contamination
and acquisition risk in close contacts by direct inoculation
or by indirect transmission by contaminated hands. The
physical contact times were mostly limited to <15 minutes
for each individual contact and the exposures took place
during the evening and an overnight stay, with limited di-
rect healthcare worker patient contact during the nightshift.
Therefore, we cannot exclude, and it may be rather like-
ly, that repeated contacts in high-risk environments such
intensive care units facing epidemic conditions may in-
crease the risk of transmission substantially. The study was
performed during routine contact tracing of a COVID-19
healthcare worker exposure at the outset of the pandemic,
and investigations not deemed necessary for assessment of
the risk for individual healthcare workers were kept to a
minimum. The study is therefore limited by its retrospec-
tive assessment of exposure risk 1 week after exposure,
and the uncertainty of individuals regarding both single
and cumulative exposure times. Finally, although the me-
dian SARS-CoV-2 incubation period is thought to be 4−7
days [12‒14], we cannot rule out the possibility that one
or more healthcare workers became asymptomatic carriers
after 7 days, because longer incubations periods have been
described [14].
Preliminary evidence suggests that brief contacts with an
infectious COVID-19 case in a low COVID-19 endemic
setting poses only a small risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmis-
sion, even without any personal protective equipment, as
long as the patient has mild respiratory tract symptoms. We
caution against extending this conclusion to longer expo-
sures with symptomatic patients. Guidelines for personal
protective equipment should be followed and adapted – if
appropriate – to specific situations taking into account fac-
tors that increase droplet burden and associated transmis-
sion risks, such as patients’ disease severity, planned med-
ical intervention and anticipated exposure time.
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